The Dialectic of Presence and Interpretation in Everyday Aesthetics:  Applying Heidegger and Gumbrecht to a Walk in One’s Neighborhood by Leddy, Thomas
56Vol. 10/22021
The Dialectic of Presence and 
Interpretation in Everyday 
Aesthetics: Applying Heidegger 
and Gumbrecht to a Walk 
in One’s Neighborhood
Thomas Leddy
Gumbrecht’s  Heidegger-inspired book, Production of Presence, provides valuable tools for resolving 
issues in everyday aesthetics. Gumbrecht distinguishes between “presence cultures” and “interpretation 
cultures.” (Gumbrecht 2004) We live in an interpretation culture, and yet even in our culture there are 
presence effects. Gumbrecht understands aesthetic experience in terms of the idea of presence. 
His  paradigms are great works of art and great athletic events, all of which take us away from the 
everyday. I argue that his theory can be adapted, ironically, to everyday aesthetics, in particular to the 
experience of taking a  walk. Much of what we experience aesthetically while taking a  walk is 
experienced in the mode of silence. But, as Gumbrecht observes, there is an oscillation between 
presence effects and interpretation effects in aesthetic experience. I  see that oscillation as something 
more like a dialectic. I also bring Plato’s theory of beauty and Danto’s theory of the artworld into this 
discussion. | Keywords: Everyday Aesthetics, Presence, Gumbrecht, Heidegger, Walking 
1. Introduction
This issue of ESPES is devoted to the application of European philosophical 
traditions to everyday aesthetics. My contribution will be drawing on 
Heidegger’s  The Origin of the Work of Art by way mostly of Hans Ulrich 
Gumbrecht’s reading in his Production of Presence (2004). Although Gumbrecht 
has little or nothing to say about everyday aesthetics in that book (it is mainly 
about literary appreciation and the future of the humanities) his 
understanding of presence provides some helpful direction for the new sub-
discipline of everyday aesthetics. 
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The terms ‘presence’ and ‘presencing’ should not be confused with another 
Heideggerian use of “presence” and correlated use of “present.” Heidegger 
speaks critically of the “metaphysics of presence,” specifically of 
Aristotle’s privileging of the present, ignoring the dimensions of the past and 
future, in his interpretation of time. In doing so, he is thinking of the present 
not only as ‘the now’ but also as eternal presence in the mind of God or in the 
unchanging laws of science, and really, the way the Forms are said to be 
eternally the same. Oxford Reference says the term “was used by Heidegger to 
characterize the central mistake of western metaphysics […] [a postulation of a] 
self-knowing and self-propelling autonomous agent, for whom nature exists 
only in so  far as it is present, which means useful” (Chandler and Munday, 
2020). Presencing, however, as described by Gumbrecht and adopted here, is 
not directed towards anything eternal or excluding of the dynamic of past/
present/future. Nor does it approach nature as present to an autonomous 
agent as merely useful. Like Heidegger, Derrida speaks of the metaphysics of 
presence as, to quote from another encyclopedia article, the “tendency to 
conceive fundamental philosophical concepts such as truth, reality, and being 
in terms of ideas such as presence, essence, identity, and origin - and in the 
process to ignore the crucial role of absence and difference” (Encyclopaedia 
Brittanica, 2020). Yet the idea of “presencing” in Gumbrecht does not rely on 
any of this, and in fact Gumbrecht joins Derrida in condemning it. In short, 
presencing is quite the opposite of what happens in the metaphysics of 
presence.
Rather it focuses on the material aspect of the object, as something in space. 
As Heidegger would put it, it directs us to the thingly nature of the thing. But, 
Gumbrecht argues, we live in an “interpretation [or meaning] culture” which, 
unlike such previous “presencing cultures” as that of Ancient Greece 
(emphasized by Heidegger), and medieval culture (emphasized by Gumbrecht), 
sees material presence as a mere stepping stone to interpretation. Gumbrecht 
does not favor returning to a  presencing culture, but he does believe that we 
should give credit as much to “presencing effects” as to “meaning effects,” 
oscillating between these (Gumbrecht, 2004, pp. 2, 19). 
Gumbrecht’s position in his book, briefly, is that the humanities have in recent 
years overemphasized interpretation and have paid too little attention to 
presencing oneself to the aesthetic object. (This could be seen as a  reactive 
defense of formalism, which always stressed direct confrontation with the art 
object.) He associates presence culture with medieval culture and meaning 
culture with modern culture (Gumbrecht, 2004, p. 79), although, as he puts it, 
“all cultures […] bring together components of meaning culture and presence 
culture.” (Ibid.) The dominant idea in a  meaning culture is mind and, 
in  a  presence culture, body (Ibid., p. 80). I  will suggest in this paper that 
a  dialectic between the two represents the best way to handle their natural 
conflict. And yet this dialectic seems to entail a  contradictory way of life, or 
does it?
The conflict between presence culture and meaning culture, and between 
presence effects and meaning effects, also takes place in everyday aesthetics. 
I  take daily walks in my neighborhood. These provide me with a multitude of 
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aesthetic experiences. For example, I  am delighted by the colorful kitschy 
display of blown-up comic-strip characters that currently populate one front 
yard. I  thrill to the view I  get of a  meandering path in another front yard 
highlighted in its greens, silvers, and dark shadows by the effects of the setting 
sun. I am amused by the look of a  lady dressed in red, covered in transparent 
plastic, standing in line in the rain, self-composed. I  take such sights and 
experiences as paradigmatic of everyday aesthetic experience, and I  measure 
aesthetic theories of the everyday by whether or not they can handle them.
Increasingly in my walks I  have come to realize that my appreciations are 
(despite such after-the-fact descriptions as given above) essentially wordless. 
This poses a  problem. How can one discuss, describe, or theorize about 
something that is wordless? However, I do not want to imply that words play 
no role in everyday aesthetic experience. First, putting your experience into 
words helps shape that experience as it expands into memory and in 
communication with others. Second, insofar as words we read impact us, they 
also impact the ways we experience the things they describe. They affect even 
the ways we experience things we never describe through establishing a way of 
seeing. So, there is a dialectic, but there is also silence.
A  poet may describe an experience in his or her medium, and then this 
description can influence how one sees the phenomenon. An English 
Department colleague at my university, Alan Soldofsky, recently published 
a  poem, titled Entitled (Soldofsky, 2021). It is about pear trees in my 
neighborhood in Spring. After reading his poem I  was able to see those trees 
differently during my daily walk. Poems consist of words. Evaluations and 
defenses of functional beauty also use words. For example, one might say that 
a  coffee pot is beautiful and defend this with reference to both functionality 
and appearance. But even after reading Soldofsky’s poem several times I do not 
have those words in my mind when I notice the way the flowers collect along 
the curb. Heidegger says language is the house of Being, and yet, perhaps 
contradictorily, it alternates with silence just as World alternates with Earth, or 
rather dialectically engages with it in creative agon. 
Most philosophical disciplines and sub-disciplines are evaluatively neutral. 
For  example, the theory of justice allows for multiple theories about what 
justice is, and each theory entails different evaluations. The theory of justice 
does not in itself imply a  way of life. Everyday aesthetics may be different. 
The  subdiscipline itself suggests a  way of life, one based on a  certain 
comportment towards things experienced. It suggests (holds? demands?) that 
one should focus on ‘the now’, on ‘lived experience’, on what the senses display. 
The very existence of the discipline promotes the thought that one ought to 
focus more on the aesthetic qualities of things of everyday life, on, as 
Heidegger would put it, listening to Being, rather than as approaching things 
as mere things, as mere equipment for our use and using up. 
Let us now apply this to the daily walk of the community aesthete. Here we are 
talking about things experienced as they are passed by the walker in the course 
of walking. The way of life implied by this practice is not only in the habit of 
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the walk. It is entailed by a  way of attending to things while engaging in 
everyday tasks of many sorts, including washing dishes. This way of life bears 
some similarity to that of the flâneur first described by Baudelaire (Baudelaire, 
1995). The flâneur, says Baudelaire, is someone with “an insatiable desire for 
seeing and feeling” and “an excessive love for visible, tangible 
things” (Baudelaire, 1995, p. 9). To be sure, Baudelaire puts the point in 
intensely emotional terms. Terms like “insatiable desire” and “excessive love” 
may be more passionate than we would feel comfortable with today. But there 
is still desire and love for the contemporary lover of sights and sounds. 
Of course, the 19th century flâneur was limited. For example, he always seemed 
to be male and well-off, and he tended more to be attracted to crowded urban 
settings than to walking alone in a neighborhood. He (or, rather, they) might, 
however, be redefined for our own context as a passionate aesthetic observer of 
everyday life, someone who seeks “to see the world with the eyes of 
an  artist” (Leddy, 2011, p. 260). This posits the ideal aesthetic walker as 
descendent of the attitude taken by artists towards life as perceived and 
represented; artists as diverse as Durer, Hopper, Hiroshige, and the Keinholzes. 
It is a way of life dominated by a non-practical attitude towards perception of 
the things of everyday life. This attitude might be described as 
‘worshipful’ (a  term appropriated from religion) or ‘non-alienated’ (a  term 
appropriated from Marxism). But perhaps the best way to describe it is 
Heidegger’s “letting beings be.” 
Also, as noted above, everyday aesthetics is broader than our experience of the 
contemplative walk. It includes also such things as cleaning the kitchen so that 
it looks ‘spick- and-span’.  The moment you look at a kitchen you have cleaned 
and say (to yourself or aloud) ‘good’, or something similar, is an aesthetic 
moment, although simple and at a  low level of intensity and complexity. 
Attending to and enhancing such moments can also be part of a way of life that 
is aesthetic.
What is the demand of the above-mentioned way of life? It is to pay attention 
aesthetically to all that is about you, letting beauty and other positive aesthetic 
qualities emerge where they can. The claim is not that everything is beautiful 
(or aesthetic) but that everything is potentially beautiful, taking ‘beauty’ 
broadly, to refer to all positive aesthetic qualities. Only when you take this 
attitude will you experience the beauty in things. Beauty here is seen as neither 
objective nor subjective but as emergent from the interaction of the walker and 
the things perceived in walking. 
2. Plato, Surprisingly
There is a  passage in Plato’s  Symposium that inspires this thought, although 
the thought is contrary to Platonism, at least on the standard interpretation, in 
which Plato is seen as bent on attacking the arts in favor of a  transcendent 
experience of eternal, unchanging Forms, none of this having a  dynamic 
dimension. On the standard view Plato has nothing to say about Beauty, Art 
and Love other than that they are eternal and unchanging. The Symposium, 
however, goes against all of this. Plato there has Socrates describe 
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Diotima’s view in this way: after advancing up the ladder of love, the neophyte 
no longer takes delight “like a  slave […]  in the beauty of one single thing, 
whether beauty of a  young child or man or of one practice.” Rather, “having 
been turned toward the multitudinous ocean of the beautiful and 
contemplating it, he begets many beautiful and imposing discourses 
and thoughts in ungrudging love of wisdom, until, having at this point grown 
and waxed strong, he beholds a  certain kind of knowledge which is one, and 
such that it is the following kind of beauty” (Plato, 1991, pp. 155, 210d). Note 
that what is apprehended is not a  thing, but “a  certain kind of knowledge,” 
i.e., a certain way of knowing things. The phrase “the following kind of beauty” 
refers to Beauty itself. So, Beauty itself is a  way of knowing things. To put it 
differently, grasping Beauty is grasping being able to see the world in a certain 
knowing way. Four stages are posited here: (1) turning to the multitudinous 
ocean of beauty, (2) contemplating it, (3) engaging in much impressive talk and 
thought (presumably philosophical), and (4) beholding and knowing Beauty 
itself, which is grasping a certain way of knowing. 
The neophyte, taking a walk in their neighborhood turns to Beauty as it shows 
itself in a multitude of places, and contemplates it. The dialogical component 
comes in as well, not directly, but in the interaction between moments of silent 
appreciation and another part of life; that devoted to reading, interpretation 
and critical discussion – what Gumbrecht calls “interpretation effects.” 
Diotima, and presumably Socrates and Plato, would also insist that this is 
interpersonal: that the quest for Beauty involves a social component, a relation 
between lover and beloved. This raises a  question: how would everyday 
aesthetics as a practice be possible without an interpersonal dimension, i.e. of 
friendship or love? Even when walking alone, if there is friendship or love in 
the home from which one walks, this provides important (although perhaps 
not necessary) background for openness to beauty.
Note four things: 
(1) Plato believes the beauty of “one single thing” distracts from appreciation 
of the beauty of particular things. This means not that one should avoid seeing 
beauty in particular things but that to follow this path one needs to open up 
and get beyond initial narrow passions. The ideal aesthetic walker 
contemplates each passing sight and moves on, from passion to passion, which 
is to say from one interesting sight to the next. There are two ways to interpret 
Plato’s  idea of “one single thing.” The first is to reject individual beauties as 
worthless. The second, less extreme way, is to only reject exclusive obsession 
with single things, for example that single person one loves. The first cannot be 
taken seriously, especially given Plato’s  stress placed on the interpersonal 
dimension of love.
(2) Insofar as the student of beauty generates “many beautiful discourses” he/
she is steeped in what Gumbrecht calls “interpretation culture.” So it seems he/
she is moving away from his so-called “presencing effects,” i.e. the silent 
appreciative engagement with the aesthetic qualities of the objects observed.
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And yet (3), through this, ironically, the neophyte presences himself or herself 
to Beauty itself. This seems to imply that presencing and interpretation are 
dialectically interrelated, that they need to work together as the kind of 
marriage, somewhat like the marriage of the Dionysian and the Apollonian 
Nietzsche spoke of as necessary for aesthetics in the opening lines of The Birth 
of Tragedy. 
(4) It is only after presencing to Beauty itself (after ascending the ladder of love) 
that the neophyte sees something “marvelous, beautiful in nature” (Plato, 1991, 
p. 155, 210e) towards which all his or her previous labors were directed. Yet we 
have seen that the beauty in all bodies is “one in the same” (Plato, 1991, p. 155, 
210b) and, so too, the beauty in all souls and in all institutions. So perhaps this 
“one in the same” just is Beauty itself, and, conversely, that Beauty itself just is 
the one and same beauty that is in all instances that participate in it. (So  the 
temporal sequence I have suggested in the first sentence of this paragraph does 
not hold.) If so, Beauty is the beautiful in nature. It is the “one in the same.” 
On  this interpretation, “presencing to Beauty itself” just means getting to the 
point that one can see the beauty in things. Each particular has its own beauty, 
to be sure, but in each instance we recognize it as the one and same beauty.
Beauty, Plato insists, is non-relativistic (Plato, 1991, p. 156, 211b). The beauty 
one apprehends in a presencing culture is non-relativistic as well, not because 
it is a matter of objective knowledge but because it is not being compared to 
anything, not interpreted, not cognized in a  discursive way. It is known, but 
non-discursively. When Diotima says “It is here, if anywhere […]  that human 
life is to be lived: in contemplating the Beautiful itself” (Plato, 1991, p. 156, 
211d) this can mean either one ought to contemplate the Beautiful itself 
independent of its manifestations, or that contemplating the Beautiful itself 
just is contemplating the beautiful in things. The latter is my interpretation. 
Admittedly, Plato does have Diotima say: “Nor […] will it appear beautiful to 
him as a  face does, or hands, or anything else of which body partakes, nor as 
any discourse or any knowledge does, nor as what is somewhere in something 
else….but it exists in itself alone by itself, single in nature forever […]” (Plato, 
1991, p. 156, 210a). This would seem to only allow for the first of the two 
interpretations suggested. Such a  statement looks to exclude everyday 
aesthetics since it would exclude focus on the beauty of individual things of 
everyday life, such as the face of a  lover. However, as I have suggested, this is 
not expelled so much as backgrounded. Beauty itself is not affected by the fact 
that all other things are beautiful because they share in it (Plato, 1991, p. 156, 
210b). But all this can only be true if beauty itself is in the hands, face, and 
so  forth. It is not affected, but it is not really, contra Plato, “alone by itself,” 
since things and lives share in it. 
It is, admittedly, unorthodox to say that Beauty is to be found only in the 
things that participate in it. It may also seem strange to think that the beauty 
found therein is not at all affected by relations. On this view, although each 
thing is beautiful in its own way, the beauty in each thing is, paradoxically, the 
same. It is the same because it cannot be described or interpreted. 
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I think there is some truth in this, but only if we interpret this passage without 
hypostatizing Beauty as something external. Better to see it as internal, i.e. in 
the things in the world perceived as beautiful. Similarly, we can interpret it, not 
as strictly eternal, but as ‘as if’ eternal, and yet still within the physical world 
we perceive. This would involve interpreting the “ladder of love” as not 
so much reflecting Plato’s theory of Forms as Diotima’s own much more down-
to-earth theory of beauty as developed in the “lesser mysteries” described at 
the beginning of Socrates’ speech (Plato, 1991, 206b-210a).
But what does this have to do  with Heidegger? Surely Heidegger’s  “letting 
beings be” has nothing to do  with the Forms as objects of a  science-like 
investigation of definitions of key concepts (i.e. the orthodox Plato). I  agree, 
and yet, as I  have suggested, there are different versions or strands of Plato. 
Diotima’s  ladder of love is not about scientific investigation or definition. 
The  Form ‘Beauty’ is never defined in this dialogue, or anywhere in Plato. 
Instead, it is grasped at the end of a process. And we only know that it has been 
grasped if ‘arête’  is generated in the disciple. Part of that arête is being able to 
see beauty in the things that participate in Beauty. The Diotima strand of 
Plato’s Symposium allows for a non-metaphysical interpretation of Beauty and 
Being, i.e. one that abjures, or at least is agnostic about, transcendent reality. 
It allows for “letting beings be,” and hence for everyday aesthetics, but only of 
‘the ordinary goes beyond itself’ sort. 
Many have argued that everyday aesthetics is all about perceiving the ordinary 
in the ordinary (Haapala, 2005; Saito, 2007). For me, it is mainly about 
perceiving the extraordinary, or at least ‘the interesting’, in the ordinary. This 
does not mean that one has to perceive the ordinary as strange. The ordinary 
need only be perceived as having what I  have called “aura” (Leddy, 2012, 
Chapter 4). Nor do I want to deny the importance of appreciating the ordinary 
in the ordinary, which is a  special kind of appreciation of everyday things. 
Artists such as Edward Hopper and Ed Ruscha have focused on this kind of 
experience. Think of Ruscha’s  book Twentysix Gasoline Stations (1963) which 
just gives us black and white photographs of gas stations. Here we appreciate 
the ordinariness of these ordinary things. But in doing so, the art, and 
indirectly, the things themselves, take on aura. The irony or paradox of 
everyday aesthetics is that, as soon as the ordinariness of something ordinary 
is appreciated, the thing appreciated is no longer merely ordinary: it has 
ratcheted up to the level of ‘the interesting’, or even ‘the extraordinary’. 
Gas stations are experienced differently after experiencing Ruscha’s work. They 
have been framed by the perceiving mind as special. This is not to say that they 
become special every day or all of the time but that, under the unconscious 
influence of Ruscha’s way of seeing (or some other artist’s way of seeing), they 
can be seen as beautiful… they become beautiful. 
3. Danto vs. Heidegger
Arthur Danto often spoke of the way in which ordinary objects are transfigured 
into the domain of art through entering into the artworld, his key example 
being Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, which, although indistinguishable from boxes 
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found in a  warehouse, take on art status and aboutness when displayed in 
a  gallery (Danto, 1964). There is something partly true about this. 
Warhol’s boxes do tell us something about the nature of art, about how we see 
art differently once in an artworld context. But Danto’s position comes directly, 
and legitimately, under Heidegger’s attack against the concept of a work of art 
as an allegory where “it seems as though the thingly element in the art work is 
like the substructure into and upon which the other, authentic element is 
built”  (Heidegger, 1971, p. 20).  
Insofar as Danto refers to the identical Brillo box in the warehouse, as well as 
to the material element of Brillo Box, as a “mere thing” (Danto, 1964), he relies 
on a  form of subject-object dualism that Heidegger sought to overcome. The 
Analytic/Continental divide is often explained away as a  matter of style, but 
here we have simple disagreement between leaders of the competing schools. 
Danto’s  theory, for all of its elegance, leaves no room for everyday aesthetics, 
for any Deweyan continuities between art and life (Dewey, here, is on the side 
of the continental philosophers), or even for the physical creation of works of 
art in the studio.  One might think that since, on Danto’s theory, anything can 
be transfigured into art, then there is no such divide.  However the division is 
strict:  when something is not yet transfigured it is a  ‘mere real thing’ and 
when it is transfigured it enters another realm, the realm of the artworld.  
Danto later refers to what happens to the ordinary thing when it is taken into 
the world of art as “transfiguration” (Danto, 1983). This is a useful metaphor, 
but he failed to see that ordinary objects are also transfigured simply by being 
perceived aesthetically, although in a  different way from what happens when 
they are transfigured into art. For Danto, when, and only when, ordinary things 
are transfigured into the realm of the artworld, do they enter into the domain 
of the aesthetic. But, on mine and perhaps Gumbrecht’s view, the gas stations 
are transfigured into the aesthetic the moment Ruscha looks at them with 
an  artist’s  eye. Then Ruscha enters the studio to make things. Entering the 
artworld is a later development.
This is not to say that the two transfigurations are unrelated: they are 
inescapably intertwined. Monet transfigures his pond when he creates 
a painting of waterlilies. But he also does it in his physical creation of the pond 
and in his way of seeing the pond before painting it, influenced, as both of 
these activities are, by his artistic project. 
The idea of the aesthetic attitude has been criticized as one that gives too 
much power to the perceiver. It has been thought that the perceiver need only 
take a  special attitude to perceive beauty, and that the perceiver must take 
a  special attitude to perceive beauty. The first claim is more problematic. 
Beauty emerges in relational terms. The aesthetic attitude is not a  willful 
thing. It is an attitude of openness, of willingness to be approached by beauty, 
which, for me, is as an enhanced sense of significance when something 
emerges as being worthy of our aesthetic attention.
But Danto got it wrong on another level. He thought that works of art can be 
distinguished by their aboutness, by their interpretability, and that it is 
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interpretation that brings them up into the world of art. In his What Art Is he 
says that artworks are embodied meanings designed to get viewers to grasp the 
meaning they embody (Danto, 2013). He also radically distinguishes between 
aesthetics and art.  Contrary to Danto, my Deweyan approach stresses the 
continuity between art and life, aesthetics being what they both deeply share. 
Aboutness is not the property that distinguishes art from the everyday. 
Everyday objects can and usually do have meaning. At the very least they have 
names and histories. So  they are interpretable. They do  not, of course, have 
interpretations in the sense of ‘meanings assigned to them by their creators,’ 
although few works of art have meanings in this sense either. Nor is 
interpretation sufficient to make the object art: someone in the artworld also 
must believe it worthy of being considered art.  Moreover, as I  have argued 
above, interpretation is not necessary for aesthetic experience, and can actually 
interfere with the presencing of Being. Of course interpretation does enrich 
our experience when we write and think about it.
In his original article, Danto implied that something is art if it is seen as art by 
someone with appropriate art historical knowledge: “To see something as art 
requires something the eye cannot decry [sic:  he meant “descry”] - 
an  atmosphere of artistic theory, a  knowledge of the history of art: 
an artworld” (Danto, 1964, p. 580). Dickie interpreted Danto’s  theory to mean 
that something is art if it is an artifact and someone in the artworld says it is 
art, or more precisely, confers upon it the status of candidate for appreciation 
(Dickie, 1969). But, as critics of Dickie soon saw, this act of conferral cannot be 
arbitrary. Appropriate art historical knowledge was required by Danto for 
a reason. And worthiness usually implies valuable aesthetic features.
It is common these days for aestheticians to see everyday aesthetic objects just 
in terms of interpretation, which is to say just in terms of how they can be 
understood cognitively. Allen Carlson and Glen Parsons, for example, think 
that everyday aesthetics must be framed in terms of the look of functionality in 
the object (Carlson and Parsons, 2012). They believe that such an object is 
aesthetically good if it looks fit for its function. In this, they exclude everything 
from everyday aesthetics that has no function or that doesn’t look quite fit for 
its function, as for example junked cars and abandoned homes. Yet, when I take 
a  walk in my neighborhood there is a  multitude of things that I  find 
aesthetically interesting that have no clear function, or even if they do  have 
a function, it plays no role in my experience. Carlson and Parsons say we need 
to have a  lot of knowledge (sometimes scientific, sometimes practical) of the 
object not only to properly interpret it but to correctly appreciate it. This is 
only half the truth. The other half is best explained in terms of 
Gumbrecht’s  concept of presence and Heidegger’s  concept of Being. My 
argument, in short, is that to properly appreciate something in everyday life 
one needs to draw both on the experience of presence and cognitive 
understanding, although not necessarily at the same time. 
Learning about the objects we see, i.e. learning about their names, functions 
and histories, is relatively easy. Experiencing an object as having presence is 
more difficult, at least for people living in our time. Why is it hard for us to 
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experience objects as having presence? As Gumbrecht says, the kind of society 
we (most of us) live in is not a  presence society – it is a  meaning society. 
We cannot go back to living in a presence society (at least not normally). But 
we can learn from such societies, and this is perhaps what atheists whose 
minds are closed to varieties of religious experience and other enlightenment 
thinkers fail to see. 
And how do we experience presence? Take a walk and observe the world about 
you. If you simply contemplate what you see without thinking at all, without 
thinking about anything, without naming what you see or how you experience, 
things will emerge as visually interesting. This can happen with the other 
senses as well. Do not think of the phrase “visual interesting,” or of any other 
term that labels an aesthetic property. Do  not ask yourself whether your 
appreciative experience is pleasurable. Let the visual interestingness of the 
thing, scene, or perceived event strike you. You will note its distinctiveness: 
that specific color, that shape, that look. This way of perceiving the world is 
much like what Buddhists like Thich Nhat Hanh refer to as mindfulness (Thich 
Nhat Hanh, 1999). Paying full attention to the phenomena on one’s  walk, 
allowing presence to happen, brings a kind of joy or, if you prefer, delight.
Does this mean that meaning, which is culturally specific, does not play a role? 
Not at all. How we see and what we focus on is culturally determined. Art, too, 
is culturally specific. Studying art, viewing many artworks, and learning how to 
paint are all activities that train the eye. The mind is stocked by these cultural 
practices unconsciously in such a way as to animate vision even, and especially 
when, the vision is not encumbered by language. Moreover, speaking, writing, 
painting, photographing, and other cultural practices happen after and before 
the moment of presencing, are comments on, and can extend and enrich that 
experience. There is a  loop that goes from presencing to the cultural, then 
presence, then the cultural, and on and on. 
Gumbrecht is right that we live in a  meaning culture and that medieval and 
classical cultures were presence cultures (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 79). We need to 
work hard to perceive the world in a different way, to focus on presence rather 
than on meaning. As Heidegger says, we no longer listen to Being. Opening up 
to the pre-linguistic presence of things opens up to Being. Heidegger thought 
that, in Van Gogh’s  art, truth comes into unconcealment. But whatever we 
learn about the art nature of art through his analysis is really about the thingly 
nature of a thing, and particularly about the equipmental nature of the piece of 
equipment, which itself is an element in our everyday lives. Heidegger’s essay 
is about the origin of the work of art but it is also about the shoes and about 
the everyday life, not only of the peasant woman, but of all of us. His point 
comes out even more when he talks about the temple and the earth/world 
relationship. However, as we will see, this needs some explanation. 
4. Formalism and Contextualism
There was something good about formalism which has been lost in our current 
unquestioning acceptance of contextualism. By “contextualism” I  mean the 
belief that something can only be appreciated in the light of understanding it 
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within its context. The thing that the formalists gave us was a direct method of 
looking at works of art.  They called on us to focus on the thing itself. 
Their  demand was: do  not think about the intentions of the author/artist! 
Do not think about the historical context!  Now, this may seem old-fashioned, 
and it is in fact overly limited: but if we are only contextualists we no longer 
look at the thing itself, like those museum visitors who only read the curators’ 
texts on the walls, or the art appreciator who pays more attention to the taped 
lecture than the work. All attention to context takes us away from 
encountering the thing itself. 
This is also true in everyday life. There must be a  moment in the process of 
appreciating the things of life that is direct – that involves attending simply to 
what we see. This is not, however, to advocate formalism. Formalism has its 
limits in that it calls on us to see things in terms of colored shapes and lines, as 
though the thing itself were defined in terms of shapes and lines. If I really ‘see’ 
the disturbing shape of this burnt log in the park on my walk I see it not just as 
a shaped color but as a thing with expressive properties. Attending to the thing 
itself does not imply formalism.
Now there is no question that what we see is strongly influenced by culture. 
There is no escaping the unconscious influence of context, of education, of 
background, of language. Nor is there any denying that more contextual 
knowledge gives more understanding. When I say that one needs to attend to 
the thing itself I  am not saying that there is a  thing-in-itself independent of 
interpretation. What I  am saying is that setting aside, or ‘bracketing’ (in the 
language of phenomenology) allows for presencing, which, in turn, allows for 
emergence of Being and, with it, beauty. 
Gumbrecht is well aware of the potential charge of naiveté, of his being 
a ‘substantialist’  as having a naïve belief in stable or unchanging substances or 
essences. The charge would be that the stance fails to recognize that 
everything is ‘under interpretation,’ that we cannot escape interpretation. 
Gumbrecht does not deny the existence of cultural meaning: he simply reveals 
a  layer of cultural objects that is not a  layer of meaning (Gumbrecht, 2003, 
p.  54). So  how does he understand presence? As bringing back “physical 
closeness and tangibility” (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 57), and also as bringing back 
something onto which we can never permanently hold (Gumbrecht, 2003, 
p. 58).  Nonetheless, and importantly, for him, when we are talking about Being 
we are not talking about theology. Rather, Being is something physical in 
space. 
Heidegger’s “Origin” essay is as much about the everyday as about art. We are 
looking for the thingliness of the thing. The first key example is a  pair of 
working shoes. These shoes are part of the everyday life of a peasant woman. 
Truth comes into unconcealment in her own life. But Van Gogh’s  painting 
intensifies and focuses that experience. What is true of art is also true of the 
artist in the world. What is true of the artist in the world is also true, I argue, of 
anyone who perceives aesthetically. 
Heidegger sets the stage in Being and Time when he talks about Dasein. 
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Our “being in the world” is already in a  substantial, and spatial, contact with 
things in the world. I would add that this correlates with G.E. Moore’s common 
sense realism (Moore, 1993). When I  see or touch a chair I am not in contact 
with a  mere collection of sense data. I  am touching a  chair. How do  we then 
account for the fact that different people see the chair differently? First, they 
do  not see different chairs. As Nelson Goodman would put it, there is one 
world, but there are many ways the world is (Goodman, 1978). There is one 
chair and many different ways of seeing it. Moreover, that there is one world 
does not mean we have to privilege physical descriptions over painted 
representations. Yet, although aesthetic appreciation may be silent this does 
not negate the unconscious influence of elaborate conceptual structures in our 
perception. Recognizing this helps us escape the charge of naïve realism while 
retaining our realism.
But what about this strange thing called “Being”? Being, Gumbrecht argues, 
takes the place of “ideas” including not only Plato’s Forms but also other, more 
recent, forms of conceptual configuration (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 67). Truth, as 
Heidegger argues, “happens,” and it happens through the double movement of 
revealing (un-concealing) and concealing. This is admittedly a  hard part of 
Heidegger. My own view is consonant with Gumbrecht’s  but moves in 
a  somewhat different direction, interpreting the concealment with more 
positive language. For me, it is the turning of the object into what Susanne 
Langer called the “image” (Langer, 1953). The object is concealed in that its 
scientific nature is set aside:  it is bracketed. The “concealed” object is 
concealed by its aura, by its aesthetic intensity. Unconcealment brings out the 
thingly nature of the thing which retreats from its context of interpretation.
As we enter Being, we enter the landscape (think of walking again, where the 
landscape is literally the one that one walks through) in a different way:  “to be 
in this landscape is the fundamental prerequisite for restoring rootedness to 
historical Dasein” (Heidegger in Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 68).  Heidegger says that 
when Being withdraws so  that the things that appear “no longer have the 
character of objects” (Heidegger in Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 69). I  say they no 
longer have this character since they have aura: aura masks interpretable 
character as objects. But that means they are not withdrawing behind 
appearance and experience. Instead, they are these very things intensified and 
bearing heightened significance. Gumbrecht and I  agree that Being refers to 
a  world of things “before” they are part of culture, and that, to experience 
them, they must begin to cross the presence/interpretation threshold, i.e. into 
the specific sphere of a  specific culture, a  culture where Being is no longer 
Being (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 70). Gumbrecht goes on to say that Dasein, human 
being-in-the-world, contributes to unconcealment through “letting things be” 
- through what Heidegger calls “composure,” an attitude which neither 
manipulates, transforms nor interprets the world (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 71).  
Gumbrecht then turns to the example of the Greek temple, quoting the famous 
lines: “This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the mystery of that 
rock’s  clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building […] first 
makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the 
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stone […] first brings to light the light of the day…”  (Heidegger in Gumbrecht, 
2003, p. 74). The Greek temple, then, brings out the expressive qualities of such 
things as storm and light. But how can this unconcealment of Being happen 
without the Temple or its equivalent, i.e. on one’s  walk in an ordinary non-
sacred neighborhood? One could say that the temple is present in the 
perceptive attitude of the walker. Thus, I  do  not completely agree with 
Gumbrecht that “[o]nly the presence of certain things (in this case, the 
presence of the temple) opens up the possibility of other things appearing in 
their primordial material qualities […]” (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 74). The “certain 
things” do not themselves have to be present. Perhaps ‘attitude’  is not enough 
of an answer. Perhaps there is one modern “temple” whose precinct extends as 
far as my neighborhood, that temple being Danto’s “Artworld.” Perhaps another 
is the practice of a  Buddhist monk. Perhaps there are many things that can 
establish a “temple” even in our 21st century context.
Readers of Origins often find the relationship of “earth” and “world” to be 
particularly difficult. Gumbrecht offers his own solution specifically in terms of 
two interpretations of “world” and two theories of how “world, “earth”, and 
“Being” should be related (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 75). The first sees references to 
“destiny” and “gods” as “integrative modalities within Being.” (Ibid.) 
Such terms do not refer to individual things or dependent on specific cultures. 
Being unconcealed to Greek peasants is not Being unconcealed to 21st century 
academics. This relativism makes them very unlike Plato’s  Forms. “World” on 
this interpretation is “the changing configurations and structures of which 
Being as substance [earth] can be a part” (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 76).
In the second interpretation, which Gumbrecht prefers because it fits his idea 
of tension between presence and meaning, “world” is excluded from Being. 
On this view, Being is “tangible things, seen independently of their culturally 
specific situations” (Ibid.), but with an understanding that this is in tension 
with the context of those very situations. Thus, on this view, earth and world 
“diverge within this togetherness.” (Ibid.)  Or, as Heidegger puts it, 
“In essential striving [earth and world] raise each other into the self-assertion 
of their nature.” (Ibid.)  Gumbrecht interprets this as the tension between 
presence and meaning. It is not clear to me, however, why these two 
interpretations are taken to be incongruent: instead they seem to be two sides 
of the same point.
5. One Difficulty
There is one difficulty with application of Gumbrecht’s  ideas to everyday 
aesthetics. His only explicit discussion of aesthetics in Production of Presence 
makes a  strong contrast between what he calls “moments of intensity” and 
everyday life (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 97). He writes that “what we call ‘aesthetic 
experience’ always provides us with certain experiences of intensity that we 
cannot find in the historically and culturally specific everyday worlds that we 
inhabit,” (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 99) and, further, that it provides “something 
that our everyday worlds are not capable of offering us” (Gumbrecht, 2003, 
p. 100). Moreover, “aesthetic experience will necessarily be located at a certain 
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distance from these everyday worlds”  (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 101). His ideal 
aesthetic experience is one of being lost in focused intensity which is “the 
element of distance vis-à-vis the everyday world” (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 104). 
His key example is of the focused intensity of the extreme levels of 
performance of an expert athlete. This is very different from the intensity of 
the contemporary flâneur wandering the urban and suburban streets that 
I advocate.
This opposition of the aesthetic and the everyday seems to make an aesthetics 
of everyday life impossible. And yet Gumbrecht can be interpreted as attacking 
a  certain kind of everyday experience, an alienated one, one that we long to 
escape. Thus he asks: “are we not precisely longing for presence, is our desire 
for tangibility not so  intense – because our own everyday environment is 
so  almost insuperably consciousness-centered” (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 106)? 
This consciousness-centeredness is associated with the Cartesian worldview, 
still dominant today … with interpretation more than presence. Nonetheless, 
as Gumbrecht admits, we can only encounter presence effects today within our 
predominantly meaning culture. 
For Gumbrecht, moments of intensity that we mainly get from great art, but 
sometimes also from great moments in sports, take us away from the 
Cartesian-conditioned everyday, the everyday of interpretation cultures. 
And yet another example of his (suddenly being hit by the intensity of sunlight 
on arriving in a California city from Europe) is itself taken from everyday life. 
Further, Gumbrecht defines aesthetic experience as “lived experience” in which 
there is an “oscillation between presence effects and meaning 
effects” (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 107), and this definition can be applied to 
everyday aesthetic experience. In short, it is our present cultural conditions, 
constituting ‘the everyday’, as they do from a Cartesian perspective, that makes 
aesthetic experience rare - yet the everyday is still redeemable. 
Gumbrecht argues that we need a  framework (“insularity” or “focused 
intensity”) in order to experience this tensional oscillation. I believe that such 
a  framework need not be so  rarified or extreme as the events he describes 
(great art, great sport events): it could be something small, like noticing the 
way a gardener has put out two plastic pink flamingos entwined amusingly to 
form a  couple. Gumbrecht worries that we bracket the presence side of this 
oscillation in our Cartesian culture. He fails to consider the obvious solution: 
to bracket the meaning side, at least temporarily, to allow the presence side to 
come forth.
Gumbrecht speaks also of the event character of the aesthetic epiphany, the 
way in which, referring to Heidegger’s  talk of the phusis as “emerging and 
rising in itself and in all things,” (Heidegger in Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 112) this 
emerging of presence is an event. He sees the beautiful play in sport as 
exemplifying such an event. But the idea can be used to refer to something on 
a much less grand scale:  the emerging of “the interesting” during the walk of 
the contemporary flâneur. This too is a  reaction against the Cartesian 
construction of the everyday. In the end I agree with Gumbrecht that “it makes 
70THOMAS LEDDY The Dialectic of Presence and Interpretation in Everyday Aesthetics
sense to hope that aesthetic experience may help us recuperate the spatial and 
the bodily dimension of our existence… that aesthetic experience may give us 
back at least a feeling of our being-in-the-world, in the sense of being part of 
the physical world of things” (Gumbrecht, 2003, p. 116), and that the pay-off of 
this is the sense of being “in sync with the things of the world” (Gumbrecht, 
2003, p. 117). This is the normative aspect of everyday aesthetics.
6. Conclusion
How then should we, or can we, apply these ideas to everyday aesthetics? For 
Gumbrecht there are meaning effects and presence effects in all cultural 
artifacts. In this essay I  have considered taking a  walking in 
one’s  neighborhood, observing both the cultural and natural aspects and 
scenes, for instance the pear blossoms, as paradigmatic of the domain of 
everyday aesthetics. Everything seen on the walk has both meaning and 
presence effects. Everything can be interpreted, or at least categorized and 
explained, but can also be approached without this if approached while 
listening to Being. 
This implies a new flâneur, not attracted necessarily to crowds (Baudelaire) or 
arcades (Benjamin) but to the entire panoply of the everyday. This flâneur looks 
at the world as an artist does or would, having a passion for seeing and feeling. 
As he or she walks through their neighborhood things emerge into beauty 
sequentially: first the children’s  toy, then a  piece of garbage, followed by 
a  bramble of branches. Presencing and interpretation effects intertwine. But, 
at  least at first, the experience is silent, the presencing is wordless. Beauty 
happens. This is the same as Being coming into unconcealment, to use 
Heidegger’s  language, although with stress placed on pleasure. This beauty is 
not eternal, but is ‘as if’ eternal. The ‘as if’ eternal beauty is always the same, 
although each object of beauty manifests it in a  different way. Seeing in this 
way is not isolated. It is the practice of opening to Being. The thing perceived is 
transfigured, taken up into the aesthetic. The artist does something similar, 
transfiguring the world both with her eyes and her hands, making things out of 
materials which, themselves, are transfigured into the world of the work. There 
is not only oscillation and tension between presence of interpretation:  there is 
also dialectic. This dialectic extends to the relationship between the aesthetic 
and the world of art, the two transfigurations.
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